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Torts: Use of Comparative Fault in Apportioning
Damages for Aggravated Injuries
In addition to the important products liability issues considered
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bigham v. J. C. Penney Co., ' the
trial court's disposition of the case raises an important issue concern-
ing apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors. In Bigham,
the plaintiff, a linesman for Northern States Power Company (NSP),
was badly burned when a "flashover" occurred at the substation
where he was working. 2 The injuries Bigham received from the flash-
over were allegedly aggravated by the fabric in his clothing which,
when subjected to the heat of the flashover, melted and clung to his
skin. Bigham sought recovery for his injuries from J.C. Penney Co.
(Penney), the clothing seller.' Because any negligence of NSP in caus-
ing the flashover was completely unrelated to any negligent act by
Penney, Bigham's suit was brought only for exacerbated injuries.5 In
such an action, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the aggrava-
tion of injuries sustained in an accident, even though the defendant
was in no way responsible for the occurrence of the accident itself.
6
1. 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978). These issues are discussed at pages 995-1007
supra.
2. A flashover is an electric arc that radiates intense heat. 268 N.W.2d at 894-
95.
3. Id. at 895.
4. Plaintiff did not sue NSP, because he had received workers' compensation
benefits and was restricted from obtaining a tort judgment against his employer under
the exclusive liability provisions of MwN. STAT. § 176.031 (1978). At the time Bigham
was tried in 1976, however, Penney was able to implead NSP for contribution and
indemnity under MwN. R. Civ. P. 14.01 by bringing a third-party complaint.
5. 268 N.W.2d at 895.
6. In this Comment, "exacerbated injuries" and similar terms will be used to
refer to injuries made more severe than they would have been and also to injuries
sustained that otherwise would not have resulted at all. For example, it is possible to
sustain in a collision no injuries other than the injuries caused by a defective part of
the car interior. See Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4
SirroN HALL L. REv. 499, 507 (1973) (referring to such injuries as "second collision"
injuries, the second collision being the occupant's collision with the vehicle interior).
Although it is inaccurate to speak of "exacerbated" injuries when no injuries would
otherwise have resulted, this is an analytically identical situation; the same principles
of allocation of responsibility should be followed.
Several interchangeable terms have been used to refer to injuries made more
severe by a defective product. See, e.g., Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa.
1978) (enhanced injuries); Harrison v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 381 F. Supp.
926, 929 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (aggravation of injury); Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis.
2d 345, 353, 195 N.W.2d 602, 607 (1972) (incremental injury); Note, Torts-Strict
Liability-Automobile Manufacturer Liable for Defective Design that Enhanced In-
jury after Initial Accident, 24 Vei. L. REV. 862, 862 (1971) (second accident injuries).
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This Comment will explore the concept of exacerbated injuries7 by
examining past judicial treatment of cases in which a defendant has
aggravated a plaintiffs injuries without having caused the original
accident,8 and analyzing the possible defenses available to such a
defendant.' This Comment will then recommend a procedure to be
used in apportioning liability among those who cause an accident and
those who cause exacerbated injuries.'"
The common law rule for apportionment of damages when an
injury results from multiple causes is set forth in section 433A of the
Second Restatement of Torts." Ordinarily, an injury is treated as
indivisible, and all tortfeasors who contributed to the harm are
jointly and severally liable for all damages.'2 Damages may, however,
be apportioned among multiple causes if there are distinct harms
attributable to separate tortfeasors, or if a reasonable basis exists for
determining the contribution of each tortfeasor to a single harm.'3 If
7. The supreme court twice acknowledged that Bigham's injuries had been ag-
gravated by the Penney fabric. 268 N.W. 2d at 895, 896. In its discussion of Bigham's
assumption of risk, the court noted that Bigham had assumed the risk of flashover
injuries, but not the risk of having his bums made more severe by the melting fabric.
268 N.W.2d at 896. The court stated that the jury accepted the "aggravated injury"
analysis, even though there was conflicting expert testimony as to whether Bigham's
clothes had aggravated his injuries. Id. at 895.
8. See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
11. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 433A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT] provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more
causes.
The classic example of the situation in (1)(a) occurs when a plaintiff has been shot by
two defendants, one wounding the plaintiff in the arm and the other wounding the
plaintiff in the leg. The two wounds may be regarded as distinct injuries, and each
defendant is liable only for the damages attributed to the particular wound caused by
that defendant. Id. comment b.
12. See generally W. PaOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS, § 50, at 314-17
(4th ed. 1971); Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. Rav. 399 (1939).
See also Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 366 n.1 (Minn. 1977).
13. In some cases, the damages may be severable because a lapse of time makes
it obvious that the injuries were caused by distinct occurrences. For cases discussing
apportionment of these successive injuries, see Golden v. Lerch Bros., 203 Minn. 211,
281 N.W. 249 (1938); McGannon v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 160 Minn. 143, 199 N.W.
894 (1924). But see Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970) (although
injuries were caused by two separate and distinct impacts, trial court determined that
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distinct harms caused by separate tortfeasors are shown, the courts
treat the harms as separate torts, with each tortfeasor liable only for
the damages that he caused. 4
In cases involving exacerbated injuries, when one party tor-
tiously aggravates injuries caused by the wrongful conduct of another
party, some courts have found that a reasonable basis exists for deter-
mining the contribution of each tortfeasor to a single harm.' In such
cases, there are two possible methods of allocating responsibility be-
tween the parties causing the original injuries and the parties exacer-
bating those injuries. The first method treats the injuries as entirely
separate harms, so that parties who aggravated the injuries will not
be responsible for the original injuries, and the parties causing the
original injuries will not be liable for the aggravation-a separate-
cause approach."6 The second method also holds the parties who exac-
the injuries were single and indivisible, thus not amenable to apportionment).
Comparative negligence statutes may be viewed as a modification of the common
law rule of apportionment of harm to causes. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 16.7 (1974 & Supp. 1978). The majority of states now have a system of
comparative negligence. Id. § 1.4-.5, at 11-27; id. Supp. at 3-6. Under such statutes,
responsibility for a single indivisible harm may be apportioned among multiple tortfea-
sors in proportion to their causal fault and such an apportionment may be made even
in cases when the common law would not allow apportionment of damages. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 433A, comment i & illustration 17 (if A suffers a
fractured skull as a result of collision of two automobiles, negligently driven by A and
B, at common law there was no apportionment; but under a comparative negligence
statute A might recover).
One feature of the common law rule, however, has been retained under many
comparative fault statutes: each tortfeasor remains jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff for the entire amount of damages. Minnesota's comparative fault statute,
MINN. STAT. § 604.02(1) (1978), provides that "when two or more persons are jointly
liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attrib-
utable to each, except that each is jointly and severally liable for the whole award."
Differences in the states' treatment of joint liability under their respective com-
parative negligence systems are set forth in the appendix to American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 708-14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 506-12 (1977).
14. In cases in which the plaintiff sustained injuries in successive accidents,
courts will hold each tortfeasor liable only for the harm caused by the accident for
which he is responsible. For example, if a person suffers a broken leg in an accident,
and en route to the hospital the ambulance collides with a car and he suffers a concus-
sion, the party who caused the first accident will be liable only for the broken leg, not
for the additional injuries suffered in the ambulance accident. If the extent of plain-
tiff's injuries in the first accident is unascertainable, however, apportionment may be
denied on the grounds that the injuries are indivisible. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra
note 11, § 433A, comment d (successive injuries) with id. comment e (divisible harm).
15. See Id. comment c.
16. For example, if a tortfeasor injures the plaintiff, who in turn fails to use due
care to mitigate his damages, thereby exacerbating the injury, the tortfeasor will be
liable only for the original injury and not for damages relating to the aggravation. Id.
comment f. See also id. comment c, illustration 1.
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erbated the injuries responsible only for the exacerbation, but the
parties who caused the original injuries may be held liable for all
resulting injuries, including the aggravation-a direct-cause ap-
proach. For example, under the direct-cause method, if a physician
has negligently aggravated the injuries of an accident victim, the
physician will be liable for the aggravation, while the accident-
causing defendant will be liable for both the original and the exacer-
bated injuries.' 7 It appears that the direct-cause method will be ap-
plied when it can be established that the exacerbated injuries fol-
lowed in a direct, unbroken chain from the conduct of the original
tortfeasor.'5 When the chain of causation between the original injuries
and the exacerbated injuries is weaker, the separate-cause method
will be applied, and the original tortfeasor's liability will be limited
to the original injuries.
A recent development in the field of exacerbated injuries is the
imposition of liability on sellers whose defective products have aggra-
vated injuries sustained in accidents. These cases differ from the
usual exacerbated injury case because the claim for aggravation is not
based on the negligence of a second tortfeasor, but rests instead on a
products liability theory. For example, the manufacturer of a motor
vehicle containing a defect that exposes its occupants to an unreason-
able risk of harm in a collision has been held responsible for resulting
injuries, even though the collision was not caused by a defect in the
vehicle.' 9 Similarly, the seller of clothing that causes severe burns
17. See Schanil v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 383, 232 N.W. 708, 709 (1930); Viou
v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, 108 N.W. 891 (1906). See also Couillard
v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 422-23, 92 N.W.2d 96, 99 (1958);
Benesh v. Garvais, 221 Minn. 1, 20 N.W.2d 532 (1945); Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485,
487-88, 239 N.W. 223, 223-24 (1931); Pederson v. Eppard, 181 Minn. 47, 231 N.W. 393
(1930); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11 § 457:
If the negligent actor is liable for another's bodily injury, he is also subject
to liability for any additional bodily harm resulting from normal efforts of
third persons in rendering aid which the other's injury reasonably requires,
irrespective of whether such acts are done in a proper or a negligent manner.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970); Golden v. Lerch
Bros., 203 Minn. 211, 281 N.W. 249 (1938); Anderson v. Mpls., St. Paul & S.S. Marie
Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
18. See generally Jackson, supra note 13; Peaslee, Multiple Causation and
Damage, 47 HARv. L. Rav. 1127 (1934); 21 MiNN. L. REv. 616 (1937).
19. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976)
(strict liability); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968)
(negligence); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd
Cir. 1976) (strict liability). These automobile defect cases are referred to as
"crashworthiness" cases because the manufacturers are held to a legal duty to design
vehicles that will protect their occupants from unreasonable risks of injury in the event
a vehicle crashes. These cases are also categorized as "second collision" cases when
additional injuries are caused by the force of an occupant colliding with a part of a
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when ignited in a fire created by another cause has been held liable
for injuries resulting from those burns." In some of these cases, courts
have apportioned responsibility for damages by using a "two-injury"
or "two-accident" approach: the seller of the product responsible for
the second or exacerbated injury is liable only for damages attributed
to that injury and is not liable for the original injuries that would
have been incurred anyway.2' In such cases, it is not clear which of
the two methods of apportionment discussed above will be followed.
In other words, it is uncertain whether the tortfeasor who caused the
original accident or injuries will be held to be a direct cause of the
aggravated injuries.
In all the cases in which responsibility is allocated under section
433A, the apportionment is accomplished as a matter of common law
without use of comparative negligence statutes. Comparative negli-
gence in many states, including Minnesota,2 is used to measure the
relative contribution of multiple parties to a single injury.2 In exacer-
bated injury cases, however, comparative negligence should not
apply, since the apportionment is not between those responsible for
a single injury, but is instead between those responsible for the origi-
nal injury and those responsible for the aggravated injury.24 The tort-
feasor causing the exacerbated injury is liable only for damages for
that injury. Since he cannot be held responsible for injuries that
would have occurred regardless of his conduct,2 it is inappropriate to
vehicle's interior after the initial collision. See generally Note, Liability for Negligent
Automobile Design, 52 IowA L. Rav. 953, 967 (1967); Comment, Automobile Design
Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 303
(1969).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 269 Or. 643, 525 P.2d 1299 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968):
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufac-
turer to liability for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the
defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would
have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective
design.
22. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, .02(2) (1978).
23. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Gerber Indus. Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (1977); V. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 13, § 16.3-.4, at 252-53.
24. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 433A, comment c.
25. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 433A, comment c; Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems
of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBui N L. J. 600, 607-
09 (1976); Note, The Automobile Manufacturer's Liability to Pedestrians for Exterior
Design, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1654, 1665 (1973).
In Larsen, the Eighth Circuit rejected the contention that the exacerbated injuries
could not be separated from the other accident injuries:
The obstacles of apportionment are not insurmountable. It is done with
regularity in those jurisdictions applying comparative negligence statutes
19791 1013
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
compare the fault of the two parties.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has implicitly followed the rule
of section 433A and has upheld apportionment of damages in cases
in which there were distinct harms or in which a reasonable basis
existed for apportioning each cause to a single harm. The supreme
court and other courts applying Minnesota law have divided respon-
sibility between tortfeasors when physicians negligently aggravated
injuries inflicted by another tortfeasor, 6 and when injuries in an acci-
dent were exacerbated due to a defect caused by a vehicle manufac-
turer.Y It is not yet clear, however, whether or how the comparative
negligence statute will be applied in these situations.
In Bigham, the plaintiff sought recovery for the extent to which
his burn injuries were aggravated by the clothing sold by Penney.z
Penney raised as defenses the conduct of both Bigham and NSP.
While the conduct of these parties may have caused the original
accident, it was completely unrelated to the burning characteristics
of the clothing.29 Nevertheless, the trial court submitted the case to
the jury with instructions to compare the fault of Penney, NSP, and
Bigham, thereby permitting the conduct of parties causing the origi-
nal accident to be a defense to an action for exacerbated injuries. The
trial court also required the jury to apportion damages among all
parties on the basis of an allocation of causal "fault" under the com-
parative negligence statute. 0 The jury found all three parties causally
at fault, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly.' On ap-
and in other factual situations as condemnation cases, where in some juris-
dictions the jury must assess the value of the land before and after a taking
and then assess a special benefit accruing to the remaining property of the
condemnee.
391 F.2d at 503-04 (8th Cir. 1968). This should not be interpreted to mean that a
comparative negligence statute should be applied to allocate responsibility between
accident-causing and injury-enhancing defendants. Instead, the court was only stating
that where a rational basis for allocation exists, responsibility may be apportioned; by
analogy, a jury can apportion damages between original and exacerbated injuries on
proper proof.
26. See note 17 supra.
27. See, e.g., Juhlin v. Bemis, No. 5-76-68 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 1978) (aircraft);
Gray v. General Motors Corp., No. 4-66-Div-360 (D. Minn. July 9, 1969), aff'd on
other grounds, 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970) (automobile).
16112 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Redwood Cty., Mon. 00, 197X) (motorcycle).
28. 268 N.W.2d at 895.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Accident-causing conduct should, however, be no defense to a claim for
enhanced injuries. See Sklaw, supra note 6, at 528-29; Note, Apportionment of




peal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment in part,
but did not discuss whether the trial court's procedures for allocating
responsibility were correct.
Penney should not have been permitted to interpose as a defense
the misconduct of Bigham and NSP in causing the accident.3 2 Allow-
ing a party who aggravates injuries to raise a defense based on the
accident-causing fault of other parties defeats the purposes for which
liability for exacerbated injuries is imposed. It is anamolous to im-
pose a duty to avoid aggravation of injuries caused by another, and
yet permit a party who has breached that duty to limit or escape
liability because of the misconduct of those who caused an accident,
which is the very eventuality that brings the duty into play.3 Conse-
quently, the comparative fault defenses of one who has aggravated
the plaintiff's injuries should be limited to those based on the conduct
of others that contributes to the exacerbation of injuries.3 '
In a negligence action, the manufacturer may argue that it should not be
held liable even for the enhancement of plaintiff's injuries because plaintiff's
negligence was a participating cause in his collision with a vehicle. In most
jurisdictions this defense of contributory negligence will relieve the driver of
the vehicle from liability for mere negligence. But plaintiff's negligence
should not be a defense for a manufacturer in an action for enhancement of
injuries.
Note, supra note 25, at 1666.
The question has not arisen often, perhaps because many courts follow the rule of
comment n to § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts and do not permit general
contributory negligence as a defense to any strict products liability action. See, e.g.,
Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1976); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co.,
503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973). Minnesota does not follow the comment n approach on
limitation of defenses, however, and contributory negligence is a defense to a product
liability action. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977).
Therefore, the issue of whether accident-causing contributory negligence should be a
defense to an exacerbated-injury or second-collision claim is likely to arise in Minne-
sota. In Juhlin v. Bemis, No. 5-76-68 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 1978) a federal court applying
Minnesota law properly limited the defenses available to the aggravation-causing de-
fendant.
32. Apparently, the plaintiff made no objection at trial to the submission of
defenses based on his contributory negligence or the negligence of NSP.
The supreme court found independent grounds for exonerating NSP. See 268
N.W.2d at 898-99. Had such grounds not existed, the trial court nevertheless should
not have allowed the accident-causing conduct of NSP to be interposed as a defense,
for the reasons given herein.
33. See Sklaw, supra note 6, at 527-28; Note, supra note 25, at 1666; Note, supra
note 31, at 499-500. For example, it is doubtful that a court would permit a physician
who negligently aggravated a plaintiff's injuries to defend on the ground that plaintiff
was "contributorily negligent" for being injured when he sought the physician's aid.
34. Examples of such defenses, based on plaintiffs misconduct, include the fol-
lowing: in an action against a physician for aggravation of injuries, the plaintiff's
negligent failure to disclose facts that would have enabled the physician to avoid the
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The best and simplest way to solve this problem is to apply the
separate-cause method of apportionment" and hold that those par-
ties having caused the original injuries are not responsible for the
exacerbation. The separate cause method is consistent with the fore-
seeability element of proximate cause. Although it is foreseeable that
one's actions may cause injury, it is often not foreseeable that such
injury will be aggravated by another . 3 Under the separate cause
method, once it is established that a divisible portion of the total
harm is due to the tortious conduct of the party alleged to have
aggravated the injuries, the chain of causation is broken for the par-
ties causing the original injury, and they will not be held responsible
for the harm resulting from the aggravation of the injury. Because the
conduct causing the original injury is not considered to be a cause of
the aggravated injuries, no comparative fault defense based on such
conduct should be available to the exacerbating defendant."
If, however, the direct-cause method of apportionment is used,
the problem is more difficult. Under that method, the conduct of
parties that caused the original injury is treated as a proximate cause
aggravation, see Ray v. Wagner, 286 Minn. 354, 176 N.W.2d 101 (1970) (before enact-
ment of the comparative negligence law, a patient's giving of misleading information
to a physician barred recovery in malpractice actions); in a case against a vehicle
manufacturer for its "uncrashworthy" interior, the plaintiff's negligent failure to wear
a seatbelt, see Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978); in an action against the seller of clothing worn in a high thermal
environment, the plaintiff's unreasonable disregard of warnings not to use the clothing
in such environments, see Bigham v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978)
(no such misconduct was present in Bigham; although the plaintiff may have assumed
the risk of the original "flashover" accident and have been negligent in causing it, see
268 N.W.2d at 895, he did nothing to exacerbate his injuries. Contributory negligence
causing the original injury should therefore have been no defense to the claim for
exacerbated injuries.).
35. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
36. For example, it would be difficult to sustain the proposition that NSP should
have foreseen that work clothing worn by its employees would melt and cling, causing
severe burns, if exposed to flashovers. Imposing liability for aggravated injuries on the
party causing the original injury is, therefore, justified primarily by policy considera-
tions. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 457, which imposes liability on an accident-
causing defendant for injuries caused by a negligent physician, seems to be based more
on the policy that the accident-causing defendant should not be able to raise the
physician's negligence as a defense than on a foreseeablity rationale. See, e.g., Jess
Edwards, Inc. v. Goergen, 256 F.2d 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1958); Persten v. Chesney, 212
S.W.2d 469, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948). Another policy underlying such liability may be
to ensure that the plaintiff will be able to recover from a solvent defendant; if the
physician is insolvent, the plaintiff can recover from the accident-causing party. See
Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REv. 19, 20 (1936).
37. In other words, the claim for exacerbated injuries should be treated as sepa-
rate and distinct from that for injuries that would have occurred in any event.
1016 [Vol. 63:1009
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of the exacerbated injuries. 38 Consistency would, therefore, seem to
require that the exacerbating defendant be able to obtain contribu-
tion from the defendants whose conduct caused the original injury
and was a direct cause of the aggravation.:9 For a number of reasons,
however, this argument should be rejected."0 First, some decisions
indicate that one who tortiously aggravates an injury is liable to the
accident-causing defendant for damages paid by the latter to a plain-
tiff for his exacerbated injuries.4 ' Although the accident-causing de-
fendant may be held liable to the plaintiff for the aggravation, such
a defendant is entitled to "plead over" against the exacerbating
party, because plaintiffs right of recovery against that party is subro-
gated to the accident-causing defendant. 2 The inference to be drawn
from these decisions is that the exacerbating defendant cannot obtain
38. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
39. The argument goes as follows: Although the injury-enhancing defendant is
responsible for damages for the aggravated injuries, an accident-causing party is also
liable for those damages under the principle that an individual who caused an accident
is liable for all of the consequences that proximately result, including exacerbated
injuries wrongfully caused by another. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 457 (physi-
cian exacerbates injuries). Consequently, because both parties are fully liable for the
damages for enhanced injuries, the right of contribution should exist between them
under Minnesota case law and the comparative fault statute. See Tolbert v. Gerber
Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977) (right to contribution exists when-
ever there is a common liability for the same harm); MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1978)
(contribution under comparative fault statute between tortfeasors who are jointly lia-
ble). Since Tolbert defined joint liability to include situations in which the acts of
multiple tortfeasors, whether concurrently or successively, combine to cause a single
harm, 255 N.W.2d at 366 & n.1, it can be argued that the accident-causing and injury-
exacerbating tortfeasors are joint tortfeasors for the exacerbated injuries.
40. The reasons for not permitting plaintiff's accident-causing contributory neg-
ligence to be raised as a defense to an exacerbated-injury claim have already been
given. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. Although some authorities hold that
an accident-causing defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of the exacerbated inju-
ries, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 457, it does not appear that such conduct by
the plaintiff is treated similarly. See note 33 supra. Otherwise, a plaintiffs negligence
that causes him injury could be raised as a defense to an action against a physician
for negligent aggravation of his condition. No case has been found where such a defense
was permitted.
41. See, e.g., Pederson v. Eppard, 181 Minn. 47, 50, 231 N.W. 393, 394 (1930)
(dictum); Greene v. Waters, 260 Wis. 40, 43, 49 N.W.2d 919, 922 (1951) (accident-
causing tortfeasor who settled plaintiff's claim may recover, by right of subrogation,
amounts owed to plaintiff by physician for aggravated injuries caused by physician);
Noll v. Nugent, 214 Wis. 204, 208, 252 N.W. 574, 575 (1934) (same); Fisher v. Milwau-
kee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 60, 180 N.W. 269, 271 (1920) (same).
42. This is not classified as contribution or indemnity. Instead, it is treated as a
cause of action based on the subrogated rights of the plaintiff; the accident-causing
defendant who paid plaintiff's claim may enforce plaintiff's cause of action against the
exacerbating party to recover damages paid in settlement for the aggravated injury.
See note 41 supra.
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contribution from the accident-causing defendants. Second, the right
to contribution exists only when there is joint liability for a single
injury. 3 Since the accident-causing and the injury-enhancing parties
are not joint tortfeasors," there is no basis for allowing the latter to
obtain contribution. Third, the rule that the original, accident-
causing defendant is liable for all resulting damages, including those
for enhanced injuries, may be justified by the remedial policy of not
permitting that defendant to escape liability because of the subse-
quent misconduct of one who enhances the injury. 5 That policy, how-
ever, does not justify allowing the injury-enhancing defendant to ob-
tain contribution from the accident-causing parties. Finally, the
same policy that precludes the accident-causing negligence of the
plaintiff from being asserted as a defense should preclude contribu-
tion from the accident-causing defendant to the exacerbating defen-
dant. The party responsible for the exacerbation should not be per-
mitted to reduce his responsibility by obtaining contribution from a
party whose accident-causing misconduct would not have caused the
enhanced injuries but for the injury-exacerbating defendant's fault.
The availability of a comparative fault statute, such as that
provided in Minnesota,47 should not change these principles. There
is a danger that comparative fault will be seen as a panacea for all of
the difficulties of apportionment. For example, it has been suggested
that such statutes be used as a means of allocating responsibility for
all harms, including enhanced injuries, between all accident-causing
and injury-aggravating tortfeasors on the basis of a single comparison
of causal fault.18 Such a solution would permit accident-causing fault
to be compared with injury-exacerbating fault, and would combine
apportionment of damages with comparison of fault.
Despite the simplicity of such an approach, for several reasons
it should not be adopted. First, it has generally been held that the
adoption of comparative negligence does not create new liabilities or
abolish existing ones.49 A comparative fault standard typically con-
tains a joint and several liability provision which could operate to
shift the burden of an uncollectable liability to a less blameworthy
party. 0 Use of comparative fault to allow accident-causing fault to
43. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1978); note 44 supra.
44. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 433A, comment i.
45. See note 36 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
47. MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1978).
48. Galerstein, A Review of Crashworthiness, 45 J. Am L. & CoM. (1979) (forth-
coming).
49. Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 141, 210 N.W.2d 58, 63 (1973).
50. See note 23 supra..
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be raised as a defense to an exacerbate-injury claim is, therefore,
contrary to generally accepted notions about the intended effect of
comparative negligence statutes. Second, comparative fault is a con-
cept distinct from that of the apportionment of harms among sepa-
rate causes. The former is designed to allocate responsibility for a
single injury on the basis of the causal fault of each party. The latter
is aimed at allocating responsibility among actors who have caused
separate injuries. The comparison statute is therefore inappropriately
used when combined with apportionment of harms in a single exer-
cise.' Third, such a procedure would, in effect, abolish the common
law distinction between original and enhanced injuries, and treat all
harms resulting from an accident as a single indivisible injury. There
is no reason to believe that legislatures, in enacting comparative fault
statutes, intended to work this change in common law.52
51. Under such a system, the jury would be required to apportion both fault and
the amount of damages attributable to separate causes in a single allocation of percen-
tages. If, for example, the accident-causing party caused 10% of the damages, but was
much more negligent than the injury-aggravating defendant, who caused 90% of the
damages, the jury would have to balance fault and damages in a single apportionment.
This could lead to confusion and arbitrary results. See notes 53-56 infra and accompa-
nying text.
52. A statute in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, see
Bloom v. American Express Co., 222 Minn. 249, 253, 23 N.W.2d 570,573 (1946), except
that a remedial statute may be liberally construed to effectuate the intended remedy,
see Blankholm v. Fearing, 222 Minn. 51, 56, 22 N.W.2d 853, 855 (1946). Since the
Minnesota comparative negligence statute is in derogation of the common law rule that
contributory negligence is a complete bar and since the remedial purpose of the statute
will not be furthered by permitting an injury-aggravating defendant to defend on the
basis of the accident-causing conduct of the plaintiff or other defendants, the compara-
tive negligence statute should not be applied so as to abolish common-law distinctions
between original and exacerbated injuries, or to supersede the principles of § 433A of
the Restatement.
The recent amendment to the comparative fault statute defines "fault" to include
unreasonable failure to mitigate damages. MiNN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978). Because
failure to mitigate damages is analytically the same as causing exacerbated injuries,
see RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 433A, comment f, it could be argued that the
legislature intended failure to mitigate damages (and, by analogy, similar injury-
aggravating conduct) to be compared with accident-causing conduct in a single alloca-
tion of fault. This argument should be rejected. The recent amendment in the statute
did no more than codify the common law, which recognized that failure to mitigate
damages is a type of contributory fault. See id. § 433A, comment f, § 918. Such
contributory fault in failing to mitigate did not, however prohibit the plaintiff from
recovering for injuries which he could not have mitigated; such injuries were treated
as separable from the aggravated injuries caused by failure to mitigate. Id. There is
no indication that the legislature intended to change these principles. Consequently,
the amendment should be interpreted to permit comparison of plaintiff's failure to




Finally, and most importantly, a single comparison of all con-
duct causing any injury would be likely to prejudice either a plaintiff
or a defendant. The plaintiff would be prejudiced in those situations
in which his accident-causing fault would, under a "modified" com-
parison statute,5 2 bar him from all recovery, even though the common
law would allow him to obtain damages for enhanced injuries.54 The
same procedure could also prejudice an injury-enhancing defendant.
While the common law limits the injury-exacerbating party's liability
to damages for aggravated injuries,55 the rule of joint and several
liability in the comparison statute could result in that party's bearing
more than his share of the loss, including damages for original injuries
that he did not cause, if the party responsible for the original injuries
were financially unable to discharge liability for those injuries. 5
The proper use of comparative fault in exacerbated-injury cases
is to allocate responsibility among all direct causes of a single harm;
it should not be applied to apportion responsibility between separate
causes for separate harms. In a case involving exacerbated or second-
collision injuries, the court should apply a common-law "two-injury"
or "two-accident" approach to distinguish between the harm caused
by the original accident and that due to the second accident-the
aggravated injury.51 Comparison of fault would then be used as neces-
sary to allocate responsibility for each separate harm. Such a proce-
dure would clearly distinguish between the apportionment of sepa-
rate harms to separate causes and the allocation of responsibility
between several causes of a single harm.
This procedure could be implemented as follows. First, the jury
53. A "modified" comparative negligence statute such as Minnesota's permits a
plaintiff to recover from only those defendants whose percentage of causal fault is equal
to or greater than the plaintiff's. See MNN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978).
54. If, for example, the plaintiff is found to be 40% at fault in causing the
accident, and the accident-causing and the injury-aggravating defendants are each
found to be 30% at fault, the plaintiff would be barred from recovery under the Minne-
sota comparative fault statute. Mn4N. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978). If, however, the plain-
tiffs accident-causing conduct were only compared with the defendant who caused the
original accident, the plaintiff could still recover from the exacerbating defendant for
the injuries he alone caused. The latter approach is consistent with common law
treatment. See note 33 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
56. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1978).
57. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 766-67 (5th Cir.
1976); Juhlin v. Bemis, No. 5-76-68 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 1978). The Bigham trial court
applied a variation of the two-accident approach when it held that plaintiff assumed
the risk of burn injuries from a flashover, but not the risk of exacerbated-bum injuries
caused by the melt-and-cling effect of the clothing. 268 N.W.2d at 895-96. The court
did not go further, however, and limit the defenses based on accident-causing conduct
of NSP and the plaintiff.
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would be instructed to determine whether the parties alleged to have
caused the original accident were at fault, whether their fault was a
direct cause of the accident, and what their respective percentages of
causal fault are. The injury-aggravating parties would not be in-
volved in this apportionment. Second, the jury would be asked
whether the party alleged to have aggravated the injury was at fault
and whether that fault was a direct cause of aggravated injuries. If
more than one party caused the exacerbation, there would be a sepa-
rate allocation of responsibility under the comparative fault-statute.
Parties whose conduct contributed only to the original accident
would not, however, be included in this apportionment. Fault would
therefore be compared only when the conduct of more than one party
contributed to the exacerbation itself. Third, the jury would calculate
the total amount of damages sustained in the accident. Fourth, if the
jury in the second step found that there was an exacerbation of inju-
ries, the jury would be required to determine the amount of the total
damages attributable to the aggravated injuries.5 8 The trial court
would enter judgment accordingly: damages for exacerbated injuries
would be apportioned on the basis of the jury's comparison of fault,
with each exacerbating defendant remaining jointly and severally
liable to the plaintiff for the collective amount of damages for enh-
anced injuries attributable to it. Damages for the original injuries,
which would have occurred in any event, would be apportioned on the
basis of accident-causing fault, with each defendant remaining
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of
damages not caused by the plaintiff's contributory fault. There would
be no joint and several liability between accident-causing and injury-
enhancing defendants."
In a case such as Bigham, involving only exacerbated injuries,"'
only the second and fourth steps outlined above would be used. In
Bigham, the jury should have been asked only whether there was an
aggravated injury caused by Penney and what amount of damages
58. In Juhlin v. Bemis, No. 5-76-68 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 1978), the jury was asked
to determine what percentage of plaintiff's total damages was attributable to the
aggravated injuries.
59. See note 12 supra. Should the court apply the separate-cause method of
apportionment, see note 16 supra and accompanying text, the accident-causing parties
would not be liable for the exacerbated injuries. Should the court apply the direct-
cause method, see note 17 supra and accompanying text, the accident-causing parties
would be liable for aggravated injuries, but there would be no joint liability with the
injury-aggravating parties. Furthermore, the accident-causing defendants could re-
cover from the injury-exacerbating parties, by right of subrogation, any amounts repre-
senting aggravated injuries paid by the accident-causing defendants to the plaintiff.
See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 5 supra.
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was attributable to that aggravation. Since the facts do not disclose
conduct by other parties that would be a defense to the enhanced
injury claim against Penney, there should have been no apportion-
ment of causal fault, and Penney should have been held liable for the
full amount of damages for the exacerbated injuries.
In cases involving claims of exacerbated injury, the threshold
issue is whether there is a rational basis for considering the injuries
to be divisible in nature. Applying a "two-accident" analysis, the
court can then ask what damages are attributable to the original
accident and what damages are attributable to the injury-
aggravating defendant. When such a process of apportionment is
employed, the conduct of those who cause the original accident is not
compared with the conduct of those whose products aggravate the
injuries. Courts applying this procedure will hold parties responsible
only for those damages they directly cause, thus maintaining the
policy of limiting liability to results that directly flow from tortious
conduct. This procedure has been set forth in simplistic terms, but
even in a rudimentary form, such apportionment is preferable to a
practice of comparing the fault of all the defendants for the aggregate
of a plaintiffs injuries.
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